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We investigate the impact of civil war on foreign direct investment flows to developing 
countries. We employ a new dataset that disaggregates FDI inflows to primary, secondary and 
tertiary sectors. Secondly, we control for a richer set of economic and institutional variables 
that could determine FDI inflows including population, GDP per capita, the degree of trade 
openness, exchange rate variability, inflation, the governance structure of the host country using 
ICRG data, and its regime type using the POLITY autocracy-democracy data. We also address 
the reverse causality between FDI and conflict and the potential endogeneity of explanatory 
variables by employing dynamic system GMM techniques in estimation. Our results indicate 
that primary sector FDI flows to developing countries are not significantly affected by civil war, 
whereas secondary and tertiary sectors FDI are more sensitive to such outbreak, potentially 
leading to reversals of existing FDI. Among institutional variables, government stability and 
control of corruption are more significant compared to regime type, law and order, and 
bureaucratic quality.  
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1. Introduction 
Does economic globalisation promote peace? Or, at a more fundamental level, can 
mutually beneficial exchanges diminish armed conflict? These questions have been at 
the heart of the debate on whether deeper economic integration among nation states 
represents a pathway to peace (Blanton and Apodaca, 2007; Bussman, 2010; Bussman 
and Schneider, 2007; Gartzke and Li, 2003). Perhaps commerce and conflict have 
features in common, despite being seemingly distinct. For example, there are two means 
of acquiring the endowment of another: peaceful voluntary exchange or violence and 
coercion, taking the form of theft or war. At another level, it has been observed that 
democratic nations that are economically inter-dependent or integrated seem not to go 
to war with each other. The theoretical basis for this phenomenon in political science is 
known as the liberal peace. The liberal peace concept in political science, as opposed 
to the realist view, states that there is a liberal tripod based upon which nations may 
refrain from war with each other. The pillars of the tripod comprise of mutually shared 
(democratic) values, economic interdependence and common membership of 
international organisations (Gleditsch, 2008). By contrast, the realist school of political 
science envisages an anarchical relationship between nation states, where the balance 
of power and the cost-benefit calculus of conflict determine the presence or absence of 
inter-state war. Economic interdependence does not necessarily rule out armed conflict, 
nor does war completely eliminate trade between the antagonists (Barbieri and Levy, 
1999).  
The idea that trade promotes peace can be traced back to Montesquieu (1748).   
Its modern version (the liberal peace idea) postulates that advanced democratic 
countries that are also trade inter-dependent will not go to war; see Hegre (2000) for 
one example of the voluminous literature in this regard. Most of this work pertains to 
international trade; the literature on the specific effects of financial globalisation, 
particularly foreign direct investment flows (FDI), is relatively limited. Bussman (2010) 
and Polachek, Seiglie and Xiang (2012) demonstrate using national dyads (pairs of 
nation states) that the stock and flow of FDI reduces hostile behaviour (not just confined 
to war) between nation states. Conversely, Li and Vashchilko (2010) show that dyadic 
conflict reduces bilateral FDI flows between high-income and low-income countries. 
The analysis alluded to above pertains to inter-state conflict. However, most 
wars nowadays are internal, chiefly taking the form of civil wars in developing 
countries. This begs the question as to consequences of the liberal peace notion for 
intra-state or civil war. Bussman and Schneider (2007) show that a globalised, trade 
dependent and outward looking economy cannot be sustained in the presence of intense 
internal conflict; however, policies to foster greater globalisation (increased 
international competitiveness) may breed discontent, as they typically involve real 
wage compression for unskilled workers, promoting inequality.   
When we come to analysing the role of foreign direct investment (FDI), a 
relatively under-investigated question is the consequence of internal conflict, 
particularly high intensity civil war, on the prospects for inward investment flows into 
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developing countries.1 Investment, particularly foreign capital, is emphasised as pivotal 
to promoting the growth prospects of developing countries. Political instability and civil 
war are meant to, a priori, deter inward inflows from abroad. Work on the risk of 
investment abroad, specifically measured by forward looking insurance premia on 
investment abroad, finds that the risk is reduced in the case of democratic regimes with 
constraints on the executive (Jensen, 2008; Jensen and Young, 2008). In contrast, war, 
including civil war, increases the risk of the returns to investment not being met due to 
uncertainties associated with physical destruction of productive assets, as well as 
adversely affecting revenue flows. Also, other political risks, including the risk of 
expropriation may be exacerbated by civil war; however, these risks may be mitigated 
by good governance, such as the rule of law.     
While there have been a number of studies examining the impact of political 
risk on FDI flows into developing countries (when FDI is the dependent variable and 
conflict is an independent variable), the literature focussing more narrowly on the 
impact of civil war on FDI is scant.2  Busse and Hefeker (2007) study the impact of 
internal conflict (as one element of political risk) and find that FDI is indeed deterred 
by conflict. However, Blanco (2012), examining similar determinants of FDI for Latin 
American countries, finds no significant impact of internal conflict. Resnick (2001) 
shows that domestic conflict (along with other determinants including democracy and 
democratic transition) has a significant impact on reducing inward FDI in developing 
countries. Using firm level data, Driffield, Jones and Crotty (2013) also find that 
conflict deters FDI.  
None of these studies, however, distinguish between different types of FDI, 
which raises the question of whether their results are invariant to sub-categories of FDI. 
For example, FDI in the primary sector, say in the oil and gas sector, may be undeterred 
by the presence of war because of the prospect of profits, as long as the security of the 
infrastructure can be reasonably guaranteed. Even in manufacturing, certain sectors, 
such as the production of ready-made garments, may not be deeply affected by civil 
war, as exit is achievable at a low cost because of the relatively negligible fixed costs 
in that sector. Other sectors, such as in infrastructure, which involve high fixed costs 
may be discouraged from entering if a civil war is ongoing, but otherwise existing FDI 
in these sectors may not be fully repatriable. Still other activities, whose capital is 
primarily knowledge or human capital based, may discount the presence of conflict. 
This is due to the intangible nature of this form of knowledge capital, which is not 
subject to war-time collateral damage. Such FDI inflows (primarily in the tertiary sector) 
may therefore be more sensitive to the outbreak of civil war. 
In this paper, we pursue this line of enquiry by investigating the impact of civil 
war on disaggregated measures of FDI flows into developing countries. Our empirical 
                                                             
1 This question is different from whether bilateral FDI flows make a pair of nation states less likely to 
declare war or be hostile to one another. 
 
2 Blanton and Apodaca (2007), among others, study the association between FDI and civil war but do the 
reverse: they look at the impact of globalization, including FDI, on armed internal conflict, finding that 
FDI significantly lowers both the probability of conflict and its intensity. 
3 
 
hypothesis is based on the premise that not every type of foreign investment flow will 
be deterred by the presence of internal conflict. Some sectors are footloose: they can 
easily relocate elsewhere, others require the investment of large fixed costs that are 
difficult to recoup in the event of localised war. Then there is firm specific capital, 
which may be knowledge based. This may reside in the firm’s intangible knowledge 
base that is not affected by war. Footloose industries may be both influenced negatively 
or positively by civil war, as they can relocate easily. Mihalache (2011), who 
distinguishes between different types of FDI, finds that investment in footloose sectors 
and financial sectors are not negatively impacted by conflict in contrast to physical 
capital intensive sectors. 
 We examine this proposition further by employing disaggregated measures of 
FDI using a new dataset that distinguishes FDI inflows between primary, secondary and 
tertiary sectors, covering the range of industries as represented in Appendix I. This is 
the first and main contribution of our paper. The distinguishing feature of this dataset is 
that it is project-based, characterising greenfield FDI which we consider is more 
appropriate in examining the impact of civil war, given that political instability seems 
to play a more critical role in the firms’ decision to enter as greenfield rather than as 
M&A investment (Demirbag, Tatoglu and Glaister, 2008). Furthermore, the majority of 
FDI inflows into developing countries are of greenfield type rather than M&A 
(Calderón, Loayza and Servén, 2002). As argued above, our main theoretical prior is 
that civil war affects inward FDI differently, depending crucially on the classifications 
of FDI into primary, secondary and tertiary sectors. In particular, primary sector FDI 
may be more insensitive to the outbreak of civil war than secondary or tertiary sector 
FDI. 
Secondly, in relation to previous studies, we control for a richer set of 
macroeconomic and institutional variables that could determine FDI inflows, including 
GDP per capita, the degree of trade openness, exchange rate variability, inflation, 
quality of governance and democracy. This allows us to check, for example, whether 
more open economies (in terms of the value of trade to GDP ratios) are more or less 
likely to receive inward investment, or whether macroeconomic instability (owing to 
inflation or exchange rate variability) hinders FDI inflows. We also look at the 
governance structure of the country using the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
data, and its political orientation using the POLITY autocracy-democracy score 
database. These governance and polity indicators may be relevant to international 
investors, and is a factor that has received relatively less attention in the conflict-FDI 
literature. Governance indicators have long been regarded as an important determinant 
of FDI inflows; see Busse and Hefeker (2007) as one example. In our case, as we are 
primarily interested in the effect of civil war on inward investment from abroad, the 
quality of governance may mitigate (or exacerbate) the effect of civil war on FDI 
inflows. Shareholders in multinational enterprises (MNEs) are increasingly wary of 
investing in war-torn societies with extremely poor human rights records, making the 
extent of democracy germane to our analysis. Democracies may be better at securing 
sounder property rights enforcement regimes encouraging FDI, but equally they may 
discourage FDI due to increased regulation and populist pressures (Li and Resnick, 
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2003).  
Finally, in light of the established literature which examines the impact of FDI 
on conflict (e.g. Blanton and Apodaca, 2007; Bussman and Schneider, 2007), we 
address the potential reverse causality and endogeneity between FDI and conflict by 
employing system GMM estimation techniques proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) 
and Blundell and Bond (1998). Given our cross-country sample of data covering 128 
developing countries over the period 2003-2012, the use of system GMM estimation 
also accounts for the underlying dynamics in the FDI inflows and individual country-
specific effects, as well as corrects for potential biases stemming from measurement 
errors and correlations between the regressors and the error term.  
Our results indicate that primary sector FDI to developing countries is not 
significantly affected by civil war, whereas FDI inflows to the secondary and tertiary 
sectors are more sensitive to such outbreak.  In fact, our estimates of the value of FDI 
inflows indicate that not only does foreign investment into these two sectors drop to 
virtually nil but it can also go into reverse since existing FDI could even flow out of the 
country in the event of civil war. Among the institutional factors, government stability 
and control of corruption are more important determinants of FDI compared to regime 
type, law and order, and bureaucratic quality.   
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 provides a brief 
theoretical overview, followed by a discussion of the empirical methodology in section 
3 and the data in section 4; section 5 presents our empirical findings and finally, section 
6 is by way of conclusion.  
 
 
2. Theory 
Consider the following profit function (π) of a firm faced with a decision about 
engaging in FDI in a potential conflict ridden territory: 
 
𝜋 = 𝑅(𝑋𝑃, 𝑋𝐶 , 𝐺) − 𝐹 − 𝐸(𝑋𝐶) − 𝐶(𝑋𝑃, 𝑋𝐶 , 𝐺)                                    (1) 
 
where R indicates revenues depending on the volume of output (X) in the states of peace 
(superscript P) and conflict (superscript C), F is a fixed costs of operation that is not 
recoverable, E is a cost of exiting the market in the state of conflict, and C represents 
variable costs depending on the volume of output under peace or conflict. We make 
revenues and costs an increasing function of a vector of governance and polity variables, 
G, such that revenues increase and costs decrease with good quality institutions, 
including sound democratic credentials. Exit costs, E, will vary with the type of industry 
as described below, but, fixed costs, F, will be higher in the case of greenfield 
investment.    
Maximising with respect to output in the two states leads to the first-order 
conditions: 
 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑋𝑃
= 𝑅𝑃 − 𝐶𝑃 = 0                                                          (2) 
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and 
 
 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑋𝐶
= 𝑅𝐶 − 𝐸𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶 = 0                                                 (3) 
 
Here, subscripts refer to partial derivatives. In equation 2, the implication is for 
marginal revenue to equal marginal cost under optimisation, given fixed costs. In 
equation 3, we observe an extra (marginal) cost of exit (EC). Furthermore, due to the 
destruction and collateral damage associated with war, Cc > CP for any given level of 
output. Some firms may be inhibited by these costs, particularly when there are large 
physical capital outlays. In footloose industries, such as garments or where the 
particular asset of the firm is its knowledge embodied in human capital these exit costs 
may not apply. Again, for some firms in extractive sectors such as oil, high prices (and 
therefore, revenues) may make it worthwhile operating even in times of conflict. The 
upshot is that with low fixed and exit costs in the event of war and high revenues (even 
when there is war) a firm may not be deterred from investing by conflict. By contrast, 
a firm with high exit costs and low war time revenues may choose not to enter a war 
ridden economy.     
 
 
3. Methodology 
In estimating the conflict-FDI relationship, there is a potential endogeneity problem as 
conflict may be dependent on the state of economic development, which in turn might 
influence FDI inflows. There could also be reverse causality from FDI to conflict, 
owing to greed and grievance related causes of conflict 3  induced by FDI inflows 
especially in low income countries. System GMM (SYS-GMM) estimation can address 
this potential reverse causality and endogeneity problem, thus overcoming biases 
typically associated with pooled OLS estimation or standard GMM estimation that 
suffers from small-sample biases and does not account for individual country-specific 
fixed effects (Baltagi, 2013).  However, it is difficult to determine proper instruments 
for all the variables that are included in the FDI-conflict relationship, but this can be 
tackled effectively with SYS-GMM estimation. 
Following Li and Vashchilko (2010) and Mihalache (2011), we use a two-step 
system GMM estimation of the following baseline specification: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                  (4) 
 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable measuring sectoral FDI of country i in year t; 𝑋𝑖𝑡 
represents the variable measuring civil war; 𝑍𝑖𝑡 stands for a set of control variables 
including the macroeconomic and institutional variables;    𝜇𝑖  represents country-
specific effects with 𝜇𝑖 ∼ 𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, 𝜎𝜇
2); and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is random error with 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ∼ 𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, 𝜎𝜀
2), and 
                                                             
3 See Murshed (2010) for a summary of greed versus grievance cause of conflict.  
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the 𝛽’s are the parameters to be estimated. 
In line with Arrelano and Bond (1991), we can specify the first-difference 
transformation of the equation above as: 
 
𝐽’∆𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐽’𝛽0∆𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝐽’∆𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                (5) 
 
where 𝐽’ is a matrix of instruments (where for simplicity we have ignored the presence 
of the explanatory variables). Under the assumption that the explanatory variables are 
weakly exogenous and the error term is not serially correlated, the GMM estimator is 
derived from the moment conditions: 𝐸[𝑌𝑖𝑡−𝑠(𝜀𝑖𝑡 − 𝜀𝑖𝑡−1)] = 0  where  𝑠 ≥ 2; 𝑡 =
3, … 𝑇  (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The system GMM estimator combines the first-
difference transformation and simultaneous determination of moment conditions for 
both the level and first-difference equations (1) and (2). The instruments for the level 
equation are the lagged differences of the variables, and the moment conditions are: 
𝐸[(𝑌𝑖𝑡−𝑠 − 𝑌𝑖𝑡−𝑠−1)(𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡)] = 0   where  𝑠 = 1  (Blundell and Bond, 1998). The 
two-step system GMM estimator is preferred over the one-step system GMM estimator 
because the former is asymptotically more efficient. However, Windmeijer (2005) 
argues that the asymptotic standard error yields a downward bias when two-step GMM 
estimator is applied. In order to deal with the bias, he suggests a finite-sample correction 
of robust standard error for the two-step covariance matrix. Hence, we employ the 
Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors. 
 Another related issue in SYS-GMM estimation is to determine the validity of 
instruments, for which there are two tests. The first one is a test for over-identifying 
restrictions, which checks for the overall instruments validity by analysing the moment 
conditions. Either Sargan test or Hansen test can be applied for over-identifying 
restrictions. In this study, the Hansen test is better because it is considered to be more 
robust in the presence of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. The second test is the 
autoregressive (AR) test, where the null hypothesis is that the error term does not have 
serial correlation in both difference-level and difference regressions. Generally, the 
estimation could allow for the rejection of no first order autocorrelation, AR (1). The 
most important criterion here is that there should be no second-order autocorrelation 
AR (2) of the residuals, consistent with the assumption of the GMM estimation 
procedure.  
 
 
4. Data and variables 
We construct a sample of unbalanced panel data for 128 developing countries, 
covering low and middle income countries based on the World Bank classification, over 
the period of 2003-2012. The list of countries included in the sample is given in 
Appendix II.  Table 1 provides summary statistics for all the variables in the model 
(including their logarithmic values where appropriate), with the figures for FDI and 
GDP represented in US dollars. These figures show that mean FDI inflows are the 
largest for the secondary sector, followed by primary and tertiary sectors, respectively. 
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[Insert Table 1 here] 
 We use these disaggregated measures of FDI as our dependent variable in 
estimations. Since civil war can exert completely different effects on FDI in different 
industries or economic sectors, a disaggregated measure that distinguishes between 
primary, secondary and tertiary sectors is more appropriate than using an aggregated 
FDI measure. To facilitate this investigation, a new FDI dataset has been created by the 
authors. Our primary source for such FDI data is the greenfield FDI database from fDi 
Markets (www.fdimarkets.com), a subsidiary of Financial Times, which provides 
project-based information from MNEs around the world covering 191 countries and 39 
industries. Transnational investments in new physical projects or expansion of existing 
investments as well as the related job creations and capital flows are tracked by fDi 
Markets. The drawback of this dataset is that it does not incorporate any 
information/data on M&As, but given our theoretical priors about the impact of civil 
war which are more related to greenfield FDI and since the latter accounts for the 
majority of FDI inflows to developing countries (Calderón et al. 2002; Demirbag, et al., 
2008), the use of this dataset is fit for purpose. 
The steps taken to create the disaggregated FDI measures from the fDi Markets 
database were as follows: 
 
i. Explore the original data by countries and industries 
ii. Record all the industry-country data including the number of projects and 
amount of capitalisation.   
iii. Reclassify the 39 industries represented in the fDi Markets database into three 
economic sectors, namely primary, secondary and tertiary sectors.  
iv. Recalculate and aggregate the sectoral FDI inflows (project capitalisation and 
number of projects) and transform the values into natural logarithmic form.4 
 
By construction, the FDI measure that we adopt uses flow data rather than stock, 
with its value represented in nominal US million dollars (transformed into logs). 
Although this may be an imperfect empirical proxy for examination of our theoretical 
priors in light of the critique by Kerner (2014), measurement errors are endemic in 
every attempt to quantify aggregate economic measures and we seek to address 
potential biases in estimation by applying system-GMM and conducting robustness 
tests with regard to alternative measures.  For instance, in addition to the value of 
projects, we also use the number of projects to quantify our FDI measure for each sector.  
Furthermore, while we attempt to classify fDi Markets’s 39 industries into three 
economic sectors (primary, secondary and tertiary) using the standard US input-output 
matrix of industrial classification, the original database aggregates FDI data for 
                                                             
4 By definition, all project values are positive, thus allowing transformation into logarithms. In addition 
to value of FDI projects (capitalisation), we also collect (as part of robustness) the data on the number of 
FDI projects for each economic sector. In constructing these measures, we account for all the information 
available in the database.   
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secondary and tertiary sectors into one or more industries, where such industries can be 
both services and manufacturing. 5  To mitigate the effect of such potential 
misclassification of FDI data, we conduct a robustness test by combining the secondary 
and tertiary sectors data to represent a non-primary FDI measure (to distinguish from 
primary sector FDI).  
With regard to the main independent variable (civil war), a similar issue of 
representation and measurement arises. Busse and Hefeker (2007) and Blanco (2012) 
use the ICRG internal conflict data, an index ranging from 0 to 12. This is a broader 
risk-based measure characterising the potential of the host country to experience 
conflict, covering elements of civil unrest as well as political violence (short of war). 
Such a measure is not quite representative of civil war as defined by the occurrence of 
high-intensity conflict. An alternative measure could be outcome based, quantifying the 
recent history of civil war with varying degrees of occurrence.  One such measure is 
based on “event counts” data of domestic conflict as used by Resnick (2001), but this 
is also not representative in our case as it accounts for onsets of low intensity conflict. 
Blanton and Apocada (2007) and Bussmann and Schneider (2007) use a binary 
indicator of (armed) conflict using a threshold of battle-related deaths. Since civil wars 
are exclusively a developing country phenomenon (Blanton and Apodaca, 2007) and as 
nearly every developing country has some form of violent upheaval if a ten or twenty 
year time horizon is considered, the use of a binary indicator of high intensity civil 
conflict seems an appropriate measure of civil war in our case.  
In order to construct this binary indicator, we follow previous studies is using 
the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. This dataset represents all types of conflict 
in the world from 1946 to 2012. Following Bussmann and Schneider (2007) and others, 
civil war is defined as a dummy variable, equal to 0 for no (or minor) conflict, and 1 
for high intensity conflict.6 Such a measure, characterising the potential of a host 
country to experience high intensity civil conflict, is relevant given our underlying 
assumption that not every type of FDI, particularly greenfield, is deterred by civil war.  
However, as a robustness check, we also consider the use of the ICRG measure of 
conflict in our empirical analysis. 
 The control variables can be divided into two types, macroeconomic variables 
and institutional factors. As for the macroeconomic determinants, the data for which 
are sourced mainly from UNCTAD, we account for differences in living standards 
across countries using the natural logarithm of GDP per capita (measured in US dollars 
at constant exchange rates and constant prices in 2005). Next, we include the inflation 
                                                             
5 For example, referring to Appendix I, “Beverages" includes "Foods & beverage stores” which is a 
service; "Building & Construction Materials includes "Building material .... & supply dealers" which is 
a service; "Communications" includes "Wired telecom carriers" and "Wireless telecom carriers" which 
may also  be services; “Consumer products” includes “General merchandise stores”, “Miscellaneous 
store retailers, and Nonstore retailers”, which are services; "Food & tobacco" includes "Food & beverage 
stores" and "Wholesale trade" which are services.  "Pharmaceuticals" includes "Health & personal care 
stores" which is a service. "Textiles" includes "Clothing & clothing accessories stores" which is a service. 
 
6 As used in most studies, a threshold of 1000 battle deaths is used to distinguish between non-conflict 
(or minor conflict given that nearly every developing country has low intensity conflict) and high 
intensity conflict (representing civil war). 
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rate (measured by the annual change in consumer price index, CPI) which, like tax, 
reduces real domestic income and, therefore, the incentives for multinationals to invest. 
Trade openness, measured by the sum of imports and exports of goods and services as 
a percentage of GDP, is also included to capture the effect of globalisation and 
individual country-level differences in their reliance on trade. Also included is the index 
of real effective exchange rate to account for differences in international competiveness 
across countries. This index is measured as the value of home currency against a 
weighted average of the currencies of major trade partners divided by a price deflator 
or index of costs (Rodrik, 2008). Finally, we capture the effect of a country’s economic 
size by including (log of) population, the data for which is sourced from the World Bank.  
 Turning to institutional factors, we first control for the effects of governance 
using the following variables: government stability, bureaucratic quality, control of 
corruption and rule of law. The governance data, drawn from ICRG, are survey-based, 
with scores 0 to 12 for government stability (capturing the ability of the government to 
execute its avowed policies) and 0 to 6 for the other variables, with higher score 
representing higher quality of governance. Not only is good governance crucial to 
attracting foreign investment, it can also mitigate the negative effects of a civil war on 
investor sentiments.   
Next, we attempt to capture the democratic credentials of the government as 
these attributes might also affect the investment climate. Resnick (2001) finds that both 
democracy and democratic transition are negatively associated with FDI inflows, 
implying that foreign investors actually prefer more autocracy and dislike the changing 
environment towards democracy. Li and Resnick (2003) indicate that democracy is like 
a double edged sword when it comes to the way in which it affects FDI; not only does 
it encourages FDI through better enforcement of property rights, it may also impose 
conditions on inward investment. Also, institutional investors are increasingly loathed 
to invest in repressive regimes, partly due to the bad press some of these regimes receive, 
and also because of the lobbying activities of development and human rights charities 
(NGOs). We deploy the well-known hybrid POLITY 2 combined scores of democracy 
(ranging from 0 at the bottom end to 10 for perfect democracies) and autocracy 
(extending from -10 for the worst to 0), available from the POLITY IV project 
(www.systemicpeace.org)7. In connection with the first set of institutional (governance) 
indicators, we utilise the Polity 2 data which gives a combined score on both democracy 
and autocracy, with a range of between -10 and +10, with +10 being the highest 
democracy score, and -10 the maximum autocracy score. In this calculation, each 
country is assigned both a democracy and autocracy score. Established democracies 
usually get a democracy score of 10, and an autocracy score of 0, making its average 
polity score 10. Many developing countries, even after the third wave of 
democratisation following the cold war, are imperfect democracies, combining 
democratic principles of multi-party elections (often marred by violence and 
malpractice) with autocratic powers vested in the elected executive. In these countries, 
both the democratic and autocratic scores are strictly non-zero, with the combined 
                                                             
7 We also considered the ICRG democracy variable but the results are not significantly affected. 
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number often ranging from -10 to +10. A higher non-negative Polity score indicates a 
greater degree of democracy. Table 1 indicates that the mean sample polity score is 3.33. 
Table 2 presents the correlation coefficients, showing no serious issues of 
multicollinarity among the variables.   
 [Insert Table 2 here] 
 
5. Empirical results  
Tables 3-5 present the main set of empirical results, showing the impact of civil war 
alongside other variables on the different measures of FDI, covering primary (Table 3), 
secondary (Table 4) and tertiary (Table 5) sectors.  Each table includes the results of 
estimations for the baseline model with macroeconomic controls (column 1) as well as 
additional controls of institutional variables, included individually to avoid conflating 
their effects. The SYS-GMM estimates are obtained using the maximum number of 
available observations for each regression and the Hansen test confirms the validity of 
instruments (included for up to 2 lags in each regression) to account for the reverse 
causality in the FDI-conflict relationship and the potential endogeneity of the 
explanatory variables. Furthermore, the AR2 test confirms the absence of second-order 
serial correlation in each regression.  
 In Table 3, the results show that civil war does not have any significant impact 
on FDI inflows to the primary sector (even after controlling for institutional quality, 
which has the perverse effect of altering the sign of the civil war dummy but not its 
significance). This result is plausible and consistent with our theoretical prior since 
MNEs in the primary sector (such as mining, oil and gas) are mainly attracted to 
countries with rich natural resources and, being driven by profits, will not care much 
about the onset of civil war in these countries.  Additionally, population has a positive 
and statistically significant impact on FDI, suggesting that primary sector FDI is 
determined mainly by the strength of the potential workforce available for MNEs in 
host countries. Inflation also appears to have a significant and positive effect on primary 
sector FDI inflows. Among the institutional variables, control of corruption serves to 
enhance the inflow of FDI into the primary sector. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
 Table 4 presents the estimated results for the secondary (mainly manufacturing) 
sector FDI, where the effect of civil war on FDI is always negative and statistically 
significant (at 10% level) in some cases (columns 1, 2, and 6).  In particular, the negative 
influence of civil war is found to be significant when controlling for government 
stability and democracy. The estimated coefficients suggest that, while the effect is not 
robustly significant, FDI can be reduced by around 81%-119% in the event of a civil 
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war.8 Although this effect might seem surprisingly high, a plausible interpretation could 
be that FDI inflows could drop to almost nil and even go into reverse given that existing 
FDI could also flow out of the country.9 Additionally, GDP per capita, population and 
the control of corruption appear to have positive and significant influence on secondary 
sector FDI. To the extent that civil war affects secondary sector FDI, our results indicate 
that manufacturing MNEs - which make up the bulk of secondary sector FDI - are 
generally averse to civil war, which can cause potential damage to plant and equipment 
and incur casualties for workforce and management, but otherwise these MNEs could 
be reluctant to abandon their production completely where exit is not easily achievable 
at low cost. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
 In Table 5, which presents the estimates for tertiary sector FDI, the results 
confirm that civil war has a negative influence on FDI inflows.  While this effect is 
statistically significant (at 10% level) without the inclusion of institutional controls, its 
significance is enhanced (albeit with a lower magnitude of the estimate) when 
controlling for bureaucratic quality and democracy. On average, the results indicate that, 
in the event of a civil war, tertiary sector FDI could be affected by a much greater 
percentage (around 155%-220% in the short term) than secondary sector FDI, 
consistent with our theoretical priors. The result confirms that tertiary sector FDI can 
be more even more sensitive to civil war than secondary sector FDI. Additionally, there 
is a statistically significant lagged effect of FDI inflows, suggesting that the impact of 
civil war on tertiary sector FDI can be persistent. Furthermore, GDP per capita, inflation, 
population, real exchange rate and government stability all appear to have positive and 
significant influence on FDI.  These results are generally supportive of the view that 
tertiary sector FDI, which is composed largely of footloose knowledge-intensive sectors 
such as financial services, as well as service industries such as communications and 
hotels are significantly adversely affected by civil war. The positive effect of inflation 
and real exchange rate, though perverse, can be driven by MNEs attraction to greater 
liquidity (e.g. the availability of quasi money) that might be associated with such effects. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Although the results are consistent with our theoretical arguments characterising 
                                                             
8 We follow the logarithmic approximation in interpreting these estimates so that when log (y) is the 
dependent variable, the coefficient on the dummy variable, when multiplied by 100, is interpreted as the 
percentage difference in y, holding other factors fixed – see Wooldridge (2013). 
 
9 Bearing in mind the nature of FDI data, being project-based, it is plausible that some FDI projects can 
be abandoned or the management of existing projects could be repatriated at the outbreak of a civil war. 
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the impact of civil war according to the categories of FDI, as well as across a variety of 
model specifications (determined by the addition of institutional controls), we conduct 
additional estimations by verifying the sensitivity of the results to alternative 
classification of the FDI data, as well as to using an alternative measure of FDI and 
civil conflict.  
As noted earlier, owing to the shortcoming of the fDi Markets database that 
potentially misrepresents FDI inflows to secondary and tertiary sectors, we construct a 
measure of FDI by aggregating the value of inflows to these two sectors. In this case, 
our theoretical prior is that non-primary sector FDI inflows (representing secondary and 
tertiary sectors) should be more sensitive to the outbreak of civil war than primary 
sector FDI. Table 6 presents the estimated results, confirming that the results are 
generally robust to this classification.  In particular, the results suggest that civil war 
has a significant negative impact on non-primary FDI inflows. Additionally, the 
significance and positive effects of lagged FDI, population and real exchange rate 
prevail in this classification, consistent with the results of Table 5. 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
As additional robustness tests, we used the log of the number of FDI projects 
and as an alternative measure of the dependent variable.  At the same time, we also 
considered the ICRG measure of civil conflict for the main independent variable of 
interest. The estimations were conducted for both primary and non-primary sectors of 
FDI, allowing for the same set of control variables as before.  The results, not shown to 
conserve space, are robust to these alternative measures.10 In general, conflict reduces 
FDI inflows in both the primary and non-primary sectors, with FDI in the latter case 
being more sensitive to the risk of conflict than in the former.  The effects of other 
variables are also consistent as before. In particular, population has a significant and 
positive impact on FDI inflows to both primary and non-primary sectors, while the 
influences of lagged FDI, trade openness, GDP per capita and real exchange rate prevail 
in the non-primary sector. 
 In summary, the results suggest that both secondary and tertiary sector FDI 
inflows to developing countries are heavily affected by civil war, with the effect on the 
tertiary sector being more sensitive to the value of FDI inflows than in the secondary 
sector. In contrast, civil war does not impact significantly on FDI inflows to the primary 
sector. Among the institutional variables, government stability and control of corruption 
are more important determinants than other factors, like democracy, law and order, and 
bureaucratic quality.  It should also be noted that, in all sectors, the main determinant 
of FDI appears to be population, suggesting that economic size (in terms of the 
                                                             
10  With the number of FDI project as the dependent variable, the estimated impact of conflict is 
reasonable, indicating that a unit increase in the risk of conflict (not civil war) reduces inward FDI by 
(roughly) 21-37% in the primary sector and 31-38% in non-primary sector (in the short term).  
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availability of potential workforce) is a crucial factor in attracting FDI inflows. Among 
the macroeconomic variables, competiveness (represented by the real exchange rate) 
tends to be a significant factor influencing FDI inflows in the non-primary (tertiary) 
sector. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
It is increasingly recognised that civil war in developing countries brings with it a host 
of developmental problems including economic growth retardation and the prevention 
of poverty reduction (Murshed, 2010).  We have attempted, in this paper, to gauge the 
extent to which civil war deters growth enhancing FDI flows into developing countries. 
Foreign capital in this form augments domestic sources of investment, besides having 
potentially positive spillover effects on domestic factor productivity and knowledge 
capital. Furthermore, we make an indirect contribution to the liberal peace literature, as 
applied to developing countries, and in the internal conflict context, even though the 
explicit (dependent) variable of interest is not the risk of civil conflict per se, but its 
impact as an independent variable, on FDI inflows.  
 We do not lump all forms of FDI inflows together, but instead disaggregate these 
into primary, secondary and tertiary sectors. In doing this, we take into account the 
heterogeneity of different sectors, some of which may be inhibited from entering by 
conflict, and others who are not. These heterogeneous attitudes to investment under 
conditions of conflict may be predicated upon prospects of profit even in times of war, 
ease of exit, something which is difficult when they are substantial sunk (fixed) cost 
investments in physical capital, but otherwise easy either because the firm’s capital is 
principally embodied in intangible human capital or because of low fixed costs 
(Mihalache, 2011). More mobile sectors may or may not be deterred from entering 
because of (high intensity) civil conflict in the host economy; equally they may or may 
not be induced to exit once a civil war breaks out. Immobile sectors, with substantial 
sunk costs in physical capital, such as those associated with extracting oil, gas and 
minerals should be deterred by conflict, unless the revenues are substantial. 
In accordance with these theoretical priors, we draw the distinction between FDI 
flows into primary, secondary and tertiary sectors, which thereby enables us to conduct 
an empirical investigation analysing the impact of civil war on these disaggregated FDI 
flows into developing countries. In this sense, the use of the fDi Markets database 
characterising project-based greenfield FDI data represents the main, and important, 
contribution of our paper. Consistent with our theoretical arguments regarding the 
impact of civil war on inward FDI into these sectors, we find FDI flows in the secondary 
and tertiary sector are more sensitive to the outbreak of civil war than in the primary 
sector. In fact, our estimates realistically suggest that FDI in these two sectors can even 
flow into reverse through repatriation of existing projects in the event of high intensity 
civil conflict.   
 In this calculus, while conducting our econometric investigation using dynamic 
system-GMM estimation on a cross-country sample of data for developing countries, 
we argue that governance and polity factors may loom large, in addition to the standard 
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macroeconomic control variables and the degree of openness of the economy. Thus (as 
part of our second contribution) we incorporate a richer set of control variables 
comprising both governance indicators and regime type in our econometric estimation, 
in addition to the standard macroeconomic controls. We find that governance indicators, 
such as government stability and control of corruption, trump regime type (democracy) 
and other indicators such as law and order, which are conventionally considered highly 
significant. According to our results, what matters more for developing countries in 
attracting FDI inflows from abroad, over and above economic size (determined by 
population), is government stability and control of corruption, not democratic 
orientation. 
 Our results can be contrasted to the findings of Busse and Hefeker (2007) who 
also employ dynamic panel data estimation methods and ICRG data but do not 
disaggregate FDI inflows into various types and do not study the effect of civil war per 
se: like us they find the influence of government stability and the control of corruption 
significant; they also find internal conflict and democratic accountability significant, 
but our measure of civil war is different, as is our use of the democracy database. 
Overall, they find greater significance of ICRG governance indicators impacting 
aggregate FDI inflows. In contrast, Resnick (2001) finds that democracy reduces 
aggregate inward FDI in developing countries, but we do not find this effect pertinent 
in our disaggregated data.  Our findings are also at variance with Mihalache (2011) who 
employs disaggregated FDI inflow data (with a different classification) and a slightly 
different measure of civil conflict, but does not control for governance and some other 
relevant macroeconomic variables.  
 From the liberal peace standpoint, a view that suggests that economic 
globalisation is unlikely to be sustainable in situations of intense civil war, our results 
are rather mixed. When it comes to primary sector inward investment, a more realist 
view prevails - profit comes before the dangers that war entails. But this is not the case 
when we analyse secondary (mainly manufacturing) and tertiary (services) FDI inflows, 
where civil war inhibits inward investment heavily and more significantly in the tertiary 
sector, even after we control for institutional factors which can arguably subsume some 
of the negative effects of war, and despite the fact that some tertiary sectors are highly 
mobile. From a policy perspective, success in attracting non-primary sector FDI does 
require conflict abatement.     
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Appendix I 
Economic Sector Industry 
primary Coal, Oil and Natural Gas 
primary Metals 
primary Minerals 
secondary Aerospace 
secondary Alternative/Renewable Energy 
secondary Automotive Components 
secondary Automotive OEM 
secondary Beverages 
secondary Building & Construction Materials 
secondary Business Machines & Equipment 
secondary Ceramics & Glass 
secondary Chemicals 
secondary Consumer Electronics 
secondary Consumer Products 
secondary Electronic Components 
secondary Engines & Turbines 
secondary Food & Tobacco 
secondary Industrial Machinery, Equipment & Tools 
secondary Medical Devices 
secondary Non-Automotive Transport OEM 
secondary Paper ,Printing & Packaging 
secondary Pharmaceuticals 
secondary Plastics 
secondary Rubber 
secondary Semiconductors 
secondary Textiles 
secondary Wood Products 
tertiary Biotechnology 
tertiary Business Services 
tertiary Communications 
tertiary Financial Services 
tertiary Healthcare 
tertiary Hotels & Tourism 
tertiary Leisure & Entertainment 
tertiary Real Estate 
tertiary Software & IT services 
tertiary Space & Defence 
tertiary Transportation 
tertiary Warehousing & Storage 
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Appendix II 
 
Country List   
Afghanistan Guatemala Pakistan 
Albania Guinea Palau 
Algeria Guinea Bissau Panama 
Angola Guyana Papua New Guinea 
Argentina Haiti Paraguay 
Armenia Honduras Peru 
Azerbaijan Hungary Philippines 
Bangladesh India Republic of Moldova 
Belarus Indonesia Romania 
Belize Iran (Islamic Republic of) Rwanda 
Bhutan Iraq Saint Lucia 
Bolivia  Jamaica Samoa 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Jordan Sao Tome and Principe 
Botswana Kazakhstan Senegal 
Brazil Kenya Serbia 
Bulgaria Kiribati Seychelles 
Burkina Faso Korea, Dem. People's Rep.  Sierra Leone 
Burundi Kyrgyzstan Solomon Islands 
Cambodia Lao People's Dem. Rep. Somalia 
Cameroon Lebanon South Africa 
Central African Republic Lesotho Sri Lanka 
Chad Liberia Suriname 
China Libya Swaziland 
Colombia Madagascar Syrian Arab Republic 
Comoros Malawi TFYR of Macedonia 
Congo Malaysia Tajikistan 
Costa Rica Maldives Thailand 
Dem. Rep. of the Congo Mali Timor-Leste 
Djibouti Marshall Islands Togo 
Dominica Mauritania Tonga 
Dominican Republic Mauritius Tunisia 
Ecuador Mexico Turkey 
Egypt Micronesia  Turkmenistan 
El Salvador Mongolia Uganda 
Equatorial Guinea Montenegro Ukraine 
Eritrea Morocco United Republic of Tanzania 
Ethiopia Mozambique Uzbekistan 
Fiji Myanmar Vanuatu 
Gabon Namibia Venezuela  
Gambia Nepal Viet Nam 
Georgia Nicaragua Zambia 
Ghana Niger Zimbabwe 
Grenada Nigeria  
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   Table 1.  Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max Obs 
Capex1 (USD million) 1955.371 3420.21 0.03 32838 743 
lnCap1 19.9931 2.0916 10.3090 24.2149 743 
Capex2 (USD million) 2061.914 6762.151 0.01 72737.62 763 
lnCap2   19.4913 2.1588 9.2103 25.0101 763 
Capex3  (USD million) 1579.168 4663.679 0.2 50120.24 896 
lnCap3 19.3081 2.0701 12.2061 24.6377 896 
Capex23 (USD million) 3128.979 10306.28 0.01 111230.2 955 
lnCap23 19.8651 2.20134 9.2103 25.4349 955 
Civil War 0.0297 0.1698 0 1 1280 
GDP per capita 2541.19 2600.636 115.6307 17201 1275 
ln(income) 7.2995 1.1108 4.7504 9.7527 1275 
Population (thousand) 41872.81 158097.4 19.7 1377065 1275 
ln(Pop) 15.7008 2.0594 9.8884 21.0432 1275 
Inflation 0.31384 7.2912 0.0001 244.11 1123 
Trade 89.0301 41.3892 13.6402 397.5308 1137 
ln(Trade) -0.2170 0.4534 -1.9922 1.3801 1137 
Exchange 108.3406 58.0195 28.5205 940.9999 873 
Government Stability 8.2265 1.5441 4 11 850 
Control of Corruption  2.0042 0.6586 0 4 850 
Law and Order 3.0426 1.0330 0 6 850 
Bureaucratic Quality 1.6098 0.7933 0 4 850 
Polity 3.3333 5.5867 -10 10 850 
Note: Capex1, Capex2 and Capex3 represent the total annual value (capital expenditure) of FDI 
inflows to primary, secondary and tertiary sectors, respectively, with lnCap1, lnCap2 and lnCap3 
denoting their (natural) logarithmic values. Capex23 represents FDI inflows to non-primary sector, 
adding secondary and tertiary sectors (Capex2+Capex3); with lnCap23 its logarithmic value. Trade 
denotes trade openness [(Exports+Imports)/GDP]. ln(Income) is the log of GDP per capita. ln(Pop) 
is the log of Population. Exchange is the index of real exchange rate.  Polity is the POLITY 2 
variable from the POLITY IV project. 
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Table 2.  Correlation coefficients of variables 
Notes: *** Statistical significance at 1% level; ** Statistical significance at 5% level; * Statistical significance at 10% level. Variables are defined in Table 1. The sample period 
is 2003-2012.  All pairwise correlations are calculated using the maximum number of observations available in the sample. 
 
 
 
 Civil War Inflation ln(Income) ln(Trade) Exchange 
Government  
Stability 
Control of  
Corruption 
Law and  
Order 
Polity 
Bureaucratic  
Quality 
Civil War 1          
Inflation 0.1693 1         
ln(Income) -0.1178*** -0.2962 1        
ln(Trade) -0.1322*** -0.0723 0.1199*** 1       
Exchange 0.5222*** 0.1968*** -0.0500 0.0746 1      
Government Stability -0.1578*** -0.0400 -0.1314 0.0575 -0.1575*** 1     
Control of Corruption -0.1082*** -0.2611*** 0.2281*** 0.0311* -0.1646** 0.0001*** 1    
Law and Order -0.1233*** -0.1245 -0.0077*** 0.2915*** -0.1709*** 0.2374*** 0.2724*** 1   
Polity 0.0025** -0.1395 0.3520*** -0.0139 0.0083 -0.4152*** 0.2730*** -0.1666 1  
Bureaucratic Quality -0.0489** -0.3498 0.4659*** 0.0657 -0.1926*** -0.1406*** 0.2977*** 0.1243** 0.3547*** 1 
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Table 3.  The impact of civil war on FDI in primary sector 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
lnCap1(-1) -0.0662 0.0975 0.0711 0.1185 0.1668 0.1088 
 (0.1287) (0.1272) (0.1444) (0.1436) (0.1225) (0.1184) 
Civil War -0.8874 0.2658 0.0771 0.4117 0.4109 0.0809 
 (0.8782) (0.5798) (0.7555) (0.6814) (0.5733) (0.6785) 
ln(Income) -0.4023 -0.1671 -0.5055 -0.5161 -0.0462 -0.5393 
 (0.5247) (0.5708) (0.5855) (0.5098) (0.5392) (0.5619) 
ln(Pop) 0.3691* 0.3971** 0.3859* 0.3463** 0.4122** 0.3715** 
 (0.1928) (0.1703) (0.2156) (0.1650) (0.1778) (0.1799) 
Inflation 3.6031 6.5009** 7.8395** 6.3425** 7.1187** 7.9295*** 
 (3.6119) (2.6701) (3.6824) (2.9188) (3.5774) (2.7354) 
ln(Trade) -2.5739** -1.9266 -2.2101 -2.1944 -1.3359 -2.3745 
 (1.2170) (1.4311) (1.6722) (1.5038) (1.1635) (1.6384) 
Exchange -0.0001 -0.0015 -0.0017 -0.0016 -0.0005 -0.0029 
 (0.0042) (0.0031) (0.0040) (0.0031) (0.0023) (0.0036) 
Government Stability  0.1200     
  (0.1008)     
Control of 
Corruption 
 
 0.6944*    
   (0.4026)    
Law and Order    0.5029   
    (0.3255)   
Bureaucratic Quality     0.4760  
     (0.5790)  
Polity      0.1362 
      (0.2473) 
Constant 29.2281*** 19.8042 23.7539* 23.5277** 14.6218 25.2809** 
 (10.4695) (13.5119) (13.6424) (11.1546) (9.2408) (10.9222) 
N 355 320 320 320 320 320 
AR1 0.012 0.007 0.012 0.009 0.005 0.006 
AR2 0.283 0.864 0.918 0.961 0.799 0.935 
Hansen 0.560 0.802 0.616 0.825 0.675 0.710 
Note: *** Statistical significance at 1% level (p value < 0.01); ** Statistical significance at 5% level (p value 
< 0.05); * Statistical significance at 10% level (p value < 0.1). Dependent variable is log of FDI in primary 
sector (lnCap1). Estimation is by two-step system GMM with robust standard errors reported below estimates 
(in parentheses). Institutional variables and population are regarded as exogenous; the other variables are 
treated as endogenous in the estimation. 
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Table 4.  The impact of civil war on FDI in secondary sector  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
lnCap2 (-1) 0.1270 0.1429 0.1617 0.1418 0.1780* 0.1398 
 (0.0920) (0.1040) (0.1035) (0.1025) (0.1063) (0.0945) 
Civil War -0.8191* -1.0820* -1.0973 -1.0051 -1.0852 -1.1935* 
 (0.4649) (0.5967) (0.7410) (0.6547) (0.7993) (0.6376) 
ln(Income) 0.7297 0.8689** 0.7582** 0.9669*** 1.0485** 1.3298** 
 (0.4927) (0.3667) (0.3823) (0.3528) (0.5307) (0.5644) 
ln(Pop) 0.8562*** 1.0083*** 0.9744*** 0.9902*** 1.1737** 1.0896*** 
 (0.1752) (0.1971) (0.2196) (0.1854) (0.2294) (0.1888) 
Inflation 1.1059 1.2263 1.3238 1.1682 -0.1519 0.9615 
 (2.2638) (2.5722) (2.4964) (2.1441) (3.0925) (2.3490) 
ln(Trade) 0.6711 0.9653 0.8826 0.8595 2.1104** 1.2613 
 (0.7947) (0.8311) (1.0890) (0.8483) (0.9449) (1.0051) 
Exchange 0.0002 0.0009 0.0013 0.0013 0.0008 0.0017 
 (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
Government Stability  0.0074     
  (0.0468)     
Control of Corruption   0.3795*    
   (0.2071)    
Law and Order    0.1920   
    (0.1462)   
Bureaucratic Quality     -0.1845  
     (0.4819)  
Polity      -0.0685 
      (0.1646) 
Constant -5.6323 -11.0823* -10.4664 -11.5971* -20.3164** -16.9095* 
 (7.0579) (6.6916) (8.2443) (6.0083) (8.8596) (9.2682) 
N 381 354 354 354 354 354 
AR1 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 
AR2 0.481 0.348 0.359 0.364 0.245 0.340 
Hansen 0.582 0.666 0.675 0.702 0.531 0.779 
Note: *** Statistical significance at 1% level (p value < 0.01); ** Statistical significance at 5% level (p value 
< 0.05); * Statistical significance at 10% level (p value < 0.1). Dependent variable is log of FDI in secondary 
sector (lnCap2). Estimation is by two-step system GMM with robust standard errors reported below estimates 
(in parentheses). Institutional variables and population are regarded as exogenous; the other variables are 
treated as endogenous in the estimation. 
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Table 5.  The impact of civil war on FDI in tertiary sector  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
lnCap3 (-1) 0.1814** 0.2038** 0.1888** 0.2094** 0.2088** 0.2246** 
 (0.0854) (0.1009) (0.0952) (0.0978) (0.0971) (0.0960) 
Civil War -2.2037* -1.2327 -1.5516* -1.3271 -1.9166*** -1.9099** 
 (1.1848) (1.2222) (0.8516) (1.1115) (0.6310) (0.9249) 
ln(Income) 1.2889** 1.8758** 1.3677** 1.6147** 0.4979 1.1601** 
 (0.7374) (0.9350) (0.5303) (0.7551) (0.5030) (0.4756) 
ln(Pop) 0.8907*** 1.0514*** 0.9810*** 1.0526*** 0.6812*** 0.9316*** 
 (0.2364) (0.3117) (0.2139) (0.2868) (0.2208) (0.2094) 
Inflation 6.6034** 5.0148* 6.0365** 5.1902* 7.8909*** 5.5585* 
 (3.0005) (3.0206) (3.0278) (3.0507) (2.8484) (2.8956) 
ln(Trade) 1.9465 2.3769 1.8202 2.3463 0.3800 1.9804 
 (1.3669) (1.6149) (1.4291) (1.4592) (1.1711) (1.4151) 
Exchange 0.0056*** 0.0051** 0.0054*** 0.0048** 0.0055*** 0.0050*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0015) (0.0016) 
Government 
Stability 
 
0.1691*     
  (0.0979)     
Control of 
Corruption 
 
 0.3546    
   (0.3239)    
Law and Order    0.0477   
    (0.3048)   
Bureaucratic 
Quality 
 
   0.4907  
     (0.7012)  
Polity      -0.2159 
      (0.1747) 
Constant -17.7471 -28.5497* -20.4040* -25.4080** -3.3290 -17.7561* 
 (11.6500) (15.1822) (10.7887) (10.9331) (10.5793) (10.6544) 
N 465 408 408 408 408 408 
AR1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2 0.661 0.598 0.822 0.621 0.922 0.641 
Hansen 0.279 0.482 0.450 0.479 0.358 0.365 
Note: *** Statistical significance at 1% level (p value < 0.01); ** Statistical significance at 5% level (p value < 
0.05); * Statistical significance at 10% level (p value < 0.1). Dependent variable is log of FDI in tertiary sector 
(lnCap3). Estimation is by two-step system GMM with robust standard errors reported below estimates (in 
parentheses). Institutional variables and population are regarded as exogenous; the other variables are treated as 
endogenous in the estimation. 
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Table 6.  The impact of civil war on FDI in non-primary sectors  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
lnCap23 (-1) 0.1797 0.2213** 0.2208*** 0.2250*** 0.2250*** 0.2173*** 
 (0.0682) (0.0879) (0.0749) (0.0766) (0.0750) (0.0804) 
Civil War -2.4454*** -1.6335 -1.9119** -1.8790** -1.9137** -1.8849* 
 (0.9291) (1.0162) (0.8104) (0.9544) (0.7609) (0.9745) 
ln(Income) 0.5430 0.8851 0.5384 0.6082 0.6364 0.9663* 
 (0.4536) (0.6638) (0.5473) (0.5080) (0.4426) (0.5000) 
ln(Pop) 0.8364*** 1.0095*** 0.9532*** 0.9201*** 0.9542*** 1.0597*** 
 (0.2469) (0.2781) (0.2717) (0.2727) (0.2357) (0.2710) 
Inflation 4.0383 2.5214 3.2540 3.0376 3.6536 2.6282 
 (2.7340) (2.6296) (2.7466) (2.4855) (2.2522)   (2.4839) 
ln(Trade) 1.7283 2.4304* 1.9164 1.9290 1.8172 2.5475* 
 (1.7650) (1.3226) (1.4712) (1.4284) (1.3801) (1.4110) 
Exchange 0.0059*** 0.0051** 0.0055*** 0.0051*** 0.0051*** 0.0051*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0019)   (0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0019) 
Government 
Stability 
 0.0938     
  (0.0949)     
Control of 
Corruption 
  0.2904    
   (0.2789)    
Law and 
Order 
   0.0969   
    (0.1717)   
Bureaucratic 
Quality 
    0.1237  
     (0.5056)  
Polity      -0.0458 
      (0.19350 
Constant -9.8161 -19.7411* -13.9458 -13.6442 -13.9204 -20.6696* 
 (13.2073) (11.6097)   (12.1594) (11.2732) (10.2003) (10.6875) 
N 509 440 440 440 440 440 
AR1 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
AR2 0.101 0.199 0.250 0.241 0.257 0.224 
Hansen 0.486 0.669 0.652 0.688 0.523 0.663 
Note: *** Statistical significance at 1% level (p value < 0.01); ** Statistical significance at 5% level (p value < 
0.05); * Statistical significance at 10% level (p value < 0.1). Dependent variable is log of FDI in non-primary 
sectors (lnCap23). Estimation is by two-step system GMM with robust standard errors reported below estimates 
(in parentheses). Institutional variables and population are regarded as exogenous; the other variables are treated 
as endogenous in the estimation. 
 
 
